Trump to meet Erdogan in New York as Washington tests Turkey reset
President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are set to meet in New York, putting a strained NATO relationship back on Washington’s near-term…
Lauren Collins ·

Trump to meet Erdogan in New York as Washington tests Turkey reset
President Trump will meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in New York, bringing two NATO leaders together as Washington looks for firmer ground in a relationship marked by defense disputes and regional bargaining. The meeting follows their last encounter at a NATO summit in Ankara, according to the announcement, and gives the White House a visible test of whether US-Turkey diplomacy can produce more than managed disagreement.
For Washington, the value of the meeting is not ceremony. Turkey sits at the junction of NATO’s southeastern flank, the Black Sea, Syria and energy routes into Europe, which means even limited progress with Ankara can affect alliance planning, sanctions enforcement and the US posture toward Russia and the Middle East.
US-Turkey ties have long combined military interdependence with political mistrust. Turkey has NATO’s second-largest standing military by personnel, hosts important alliance infrastructure and controls access between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits. Those assets make Ankara hard for Washington to sideline, even when the two capitals clash over Russia, Syria, arms sales or domestic governance.
The defense file is the most immediate Washington pressure point. Ankara has sought modernized F-16 fighter jets and related upgrades after years of friction over its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, a decision that triggered US sanctions and pushed Turkey out of the F-35 fighter program. Congress remains central because major arms transfers require notification and can face objections from lawmakers who question whether Turkey’s regional conduct matches NATO obligations.
New York
The Syria file is harder because each side sees a different threat map. Washington has worked with Kurdish-led forces against the Islamic State, while Ankara views Kurdish armed groups along its border as extensions of the PKK, which the US and Turkey both designate as a terrorist organization. Any New York discussion that touches Syria will have to balance counterterrorism cooperation, Turkish security demands and the risk that local partners become bargaining chips in a wider US-Turkey reset.
Ukraine adds another layer. Turkey has supplied military support to Kyiv and backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity, while also preserving channels to Moscow and positioning itself as a broker when possible. That dual role is useful to Washington when it constrains Russian leverage, but it becomes contentious if Ankara’s trade, energy or diplomatic posture appears to soften Western pressure on the Kremlin.
Inside Washington, the White House, State Department, Pentagon and Congress each measure Turkey through a different lens. The White House wants leader-level flexibility; State manages alliance diplomacy and regional tradeoffs; the Pentagon focuses on interoperability, basing and deterrence; Congress weighs arms sales against sanctions law, human rights concerns and Ankara’s conduct toward US-backed partners. That divided machinery means a positive meeting can open doors, but it cannot by itself settle every file.
The timing matters because NATO is trying to harden its defense planning while Russia’s war in Ukraine keeps pressure on Europe’s security architecture. If Ankara is more aligned with alliance planning in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean, Washington gains a stronger southern anchor for deterrence.
If the meeting produces only broad language, the relationship likely returns to its familiar pattern: cooperation where interests overlap, recurring fights where they do not.
By December 16, 2026, the clearest test will be whether the meeting yields a concrete signal on defense cooperation, a joint position on Ukraine or Syria, or a visible step toward NATO interoperability.
If the White House and Ankara announce movement on the F-16 package or a sanctions-related framework with timelines, Washington can argue that engagement is strengthening NATO cohesion while giving Turkey a path back into deeper defense cooperation. If they issue only general statements, or if disputes over S-400 measures, Syria partners or Russia policy return in public, the New York meeting will look more like tactical management than a reset, leaving US defense planners and the wider alliance to keep treating Turkey as both an indispensable partner and a persistent constraint.