Iran centrifuges moved after June war, officials now say

Iran centrifuges may have been moved into deep tunnels at Pickaxe Mountain, raising Israeli and U.S. concern over Tehran’s nuclear recovery. Israeli and U.S. officials say the intelligence points to a transfer last fall, after American and Israeli strikes hit Iran’s three main nuclear sites during a 12-day war in June.

The assessment has become part of a sharper debate over whether Iran can rebuild parts of its nuclear infrastructure in locations that are harder to reach by air. Israel relayed the findings to Washington while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pressed President Trump to consider renewed strikes against Iranian weapons-related work.

Pickaxe Mountain enters strike debate

Trump has publicly identified Pickaxe Mountain as a potential target, telling conservative broadcaster Hugh Hewitt on July 13 that the site was “a possible target for a nice big fat shot.” The White House pointed to Trump’s recent interviews when asked about the location, according to the source material.

Officials and experts describe the site, known in Iran as Mount Kolang, as a long-monitored underground complex near one of Iran’s main nuclear installations. It was commissioned as a replacement for a centrifuge-assembly facility damaged after a 2020 explosion, giving it a role in Iran’s ability to rebuild nuclear equipment.

Pickaxe was not treated as a priority target during the earlier Israel-Iran war, according to officials familiar with the matter. It also has not been struck in the round of fighting with the U.S. that began on Feb. 28, even as Washington has increased attacks over the past 10 days.

Tunnels complicate nuclear verification

The Institute for Science and International Security, a nonproliferation research group, said activity has continued around the mountain for about 15 months. Its observations include truck movements, reinforced tunnel entrances, a developing security perimeter and work near an older tunnel system dating to 2007 that Iran later sealed.

David Albright, the institute’s president, said the reported transfer is credible enough to merit attention. “It is plausible that Iran moved centrifuges into the tunnels” in Pickaxe, he said.

Experts cited in the source material estimate that parts of the underground complex may sit 300 to 450 feet beneath solid rock. That depth would make any military operation more difficult and could allow enough space for storage, assembly work or a small enrichment setup, depending on what equipment is inside.

The central uncertainty is access. Nate Swanson, a former U.S. National Security Council director for Iran, said Iran’s history of covert nuclear activity makes undeclared work at a hardened underground site especially sensitive.

“A covert breakout is the worst-case scenario. We don’t know what Iran’s intentions are, but the fact that we can’t verify this site underscores how problematic the status quo is,” Swanson said. “We have to have the IAEA in there to inspect these things.”

Three paths for Pickaxe Mountain

If inspectors gain credible access to Pickaxe, the immediate pressure on global risk pricing could ease because verification would narrow the range of worst-case assumptions. For Iran’s nuclear program, access could either confirm limited storage activity or expose a more advanced rebuilding effort; for the wider nonproliferation system, it would test whether inspection channels still function under military pressure.

If the site remains closed, the opposite mechanism takes hold: uncertainty itself becomes the driver. Israel and the U.S. would face a larger intelligence burden, Iran would retain ambiguity around its capabilities, and the nuclear sector’s inspection regime would look weaker in any future crisis involving underground facilities.

If Washington or Israel strikes Pickaxe, the result would depend on whether the reported centrifuges are actually inside and whether the tunnels can be damaged enough to matter. A successful strike could delay Iranian rebuilding, but a partial attack could leave equipment intact while raising regional escalation risks and adding pressure to energy markets, defense planning and diplomatic channels.

The open questions are narrow but consequential: whether the centrifuges were moved, whether they are installed or only stored, and whether the IAEA can verify the site. Until those answers exist, Pickaxe Mountain will remain a measure of how much of Iran’s nuclear program survived the war and how much can be rebuilt underground.