Why Seychelles is back on India’s Indo-Pacific map

# Why Seychelles is back on India’s Indo-Pacific map

A commentary by Prabhu Dayal, a former Indian ambassador, argues that Seychelles deserves a higher place in India’s Indo-Pacific strategy because of its location astride key Indian Ocean sea routes. The piece frames the relationship less as a small-island friendship and more as a test case for India’s ability to deliver maritime security and development in its near seas while China expands its regional reach.

Seychelles sits in the western Indian Ocean

Seychelles sits in the western Indian Ocean, a corridor that links shipping flows between the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. For India, that geography matters because the Indian Ocean is both an economic highway and a security theater, and small island states can offer access, partnerships, and legitimacy for maritime operations.

Dayal ties this to India’s “SAGAR” doctrine, short for “Security and Growth for All in the Region,” which New Delhi uses to describe its ambition to be a net security provider and a development partner in the Indian Ocean region. The commentary suggests that India’s strategic messaging and its on-the-ground commitments must align if SAGAR is to be credible to partners that are also courted by China.

The argument lands at a moment when Indo-Pacific competition is increasingly measured through ports, surveillance, and logistical access rather than formal alliances. If Seychelles is treated as a priority partner, India can potentially improve maritime domain awareness across a wide swath of the western Indian Ocean, with knock-on effects for anti-piracy patrols, disaster response, and the security of energy and container routes.

Small island states often balance relationships among larger

There is also a wider signaling effect. Small island states often balance relationships among larger powers to maximize economic options; if India can pair security cooperation with visible development outcomes, it strengthens its hand not only in the western Indian Ocean but also with other Indian Ocean partners watching for follow-through. Conversely, if engagement is seen as episodic or purely rhetorical, it can widen the opening for rivals to offer financing, infrastructure, and security support on their own terms.

By 2024-09-15, watch for any official India–Seychelles announcements that go beyond general statements and specify deliverables tied to maritime domain awareness, defense cooperation, or economic assistance. The thesis in Dayal’s commentary is supported if New Delhi unveils new financial or technical support packages, or signs a concrete arrangement on maritime surveillance or infrastructure cooperation; it is weakened if high-level engagements produce only boilerplate language without new initiatives or timelines.