Prabowo’s Modi praise hints at closer India-Indonesia alignment
President Prabowo Subianto’s praise for Narendra Modi signals closer economic and security ties between Indonesia and India in the Indo-Pacific.
Mei Lin ·

# Prabowo’s Modi praise hints at closer India-Indonesia alignment
Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto has publicly expressed admiration for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, saying he follows Modi’s career and “copy” him, in remarks circulated in the past few days via a video published by The Economic Times. The unusually direct compliment, delivered in a high-visibility setting, is being read in regional capitals as a clue to how Prabowo may prioritise India in Jakarta’s early foreign policy calendar.
President Prabowo Subianto
The immediate news is rhetorical, not transactional. But in Asia, personal chemistry between leaders can accelerate bureaucracies and open space for new initiatives, especially in defence, infrastructure, and technology cooperation.
India and Indonesia are two of Asia’s largest democracies, sitting astride critical sea lanes that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Their relationship has long been friendly but uneven, with cooperation often strongest in maritime issues and episodic high-level visits rather than a dense, institutionalised agenda.
Prabowo, a former general who built his political brand on nationalism and state capacity, has signalled that he wants Indonesia to be more assertive internationally while protecting strategic autonomy. That posture overlaps with India’s own preference for issue-based partnerships rather than formal alliances, giving the two governments room to cooperate without forcing Jakarta into binary choices.
If Prabowo’s praise becomes policy
If Prabowo’s praise becomes policy, it could translate into faster movement on joint maritime security efforts, defence industry ties, and coordination on Indo-Pacific norms. For supply chains, a closer India-Indonesia track could also support diversification strategies for companies seeking alternatives to single-country concentration, particularly if the two governments align on standards for digital trade, payments, or critical minerals.
The geopolitical spillover would be felt across ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), where Indonesia is often the agenda-setter. A Jakarta that leans even slightly closer to New Delhi could widen ASEAN’s strategic options as competition sharpens among major powers in the Indo-Pacific, including China and the United States. It could also amplify India’s outreach to Southeast Asia under its long-running “Act East” approach, which seeks deeper economic and security engagement with ASEAN members.
By 2024-10-30, watch for concrete deliverables that convert personal praise into institutional alignment: announcements of new bilateral agreements or joint initiatives in defence cooperation, infrastructure, or the digital economy, and any Indonesian positioning on regional security questions that tracks more closely with Indian preferences. The signal is right if Indonesia formally joins or endorses an Indo-Pacific economic or security initiative that includes India, or if the two sides set and pursue measurable new trade or investment targets; it is wrong if Prabowo’s government reiterates an equidistant approach without follow-through, or if Indonesia deepens strategic dependence on China in sectors central to national security.