US and China open New York talks before Trump-Xi summit in Washington

US and China open New York talks before Trump-Xi summit in Washington

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in New York on September 20 to prepare three dispute areas for President Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping. The agenda, according to the meeting summary, covers artificial intelligence, tariffs and critical minerals, three issues that sit at the center of Washington’s economic-security contest with Beijing.

The talks began shortly after Bessent arrived at JPMorgan Chase’s Manhattan headquarters around 10:30 a.m. local time, with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer also expected to take part. Bessent told reporters before entering that he expected “focused, fulsome and constructive talks” aimed at setting up the Trump-Xi meeting in Washington later this week.

He Lifeng is one of Beijing’s senior economic officials and a principal figure in China’s macroeconomic and industrial-policy machinery. For Washington, his presence signals that China has sent a negotiator with enough rank to discuss trade, technology controls and supply-chain access rather than only diplomatic atmospherics.

Bessent’s role gives the meeting a Treasury lens: sanctions risk, investment rules, financial channels and the economic costs of any tariff bargain. Greer’s participation adds the Office of the US Trade Representative, the agency that manages tariff policy and trade enforcement, and gives the US side a negotiator tied directly to the import restrictions and market-access questions that companies follow.

New York

The White House will read any movement through a domestic political filter. Congress has treated China policy as one of the few areas of broad bipartisan agreement, especially on advanced technology, industrial capacity and dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains. That means any Trump-Xi framework would need to look narrow enough to avoid charges of concession but specific enough to justify a summit-level announcement.

Artificial intelligence is the hardest subject to reduce to a communiqué. Washington’s concern is not only commercial competition; it is whether frontier AI systems, chips and cloud services can strengthen Chinese military or surveillance capacity. Beijing, for its part, has objected to US technology curbs that it says are designed to slow China’s development.

Tariffs offer a more familiar bargaining channel. A limited tariff adjustment could give both sides a measurable deliverable, but it would also expose the White House to pressure from manufacturers, unions and China hawks who argue that import relief should be tied to enforcement rather than goodwill.

Critical minerals are the most immediate supply-chain test. China plays a central role in processing several minerals used in batteries, defense systems and clean-energy hardware, giving Beijing leverage over sectors Washington has identified as strategic. A mineral-access pledge would matter only if it includes timing, volumes, licensing rules or other terms companies can price into procurement plans.

For the National Security Council, the New York session functions as more than a trade meeting. The NSC has to balance military risk in the Indo-Pacific, export controls, sanctions architecture and alliance coordination with the economic incentives that Treasury and USTR may put on the table. A narrow bargain on minerals or tariffs could still affect how allies in Europe and Asia align with US technology restrictions.

The timing gives the meeting its importance. A negotiation at staff level can drift for months; a negotiation days before a leaders’ summit usually exists to test whether either side is ready to put language in front of the principals.

If the New York talks end with only general statements, the Washington summit is more likely to become a managed encounter than a venue for concrete agreements.

The falsifiable test is whether the two governments

release, by December 19, 2026, a joint readout or framework that names specific steps on AI governance, tariff treatment and critical-mineral access. If Beijing accepts staged commitments with verifiable milestones, the White House would gain a summit deliverable, Treasury and USTR could begin translating it into rules, and global markets would likely treat it as a limited easing of supply-chain risk.

If the parties produce only broad language, the talks will point instead toward a slower drift from de-risking into managed separation, leaving US companies with continued uncertainty on sourcing, pricing and technology compliance.